Club提要：美国哥伦比亚大学教授杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffery Sachs）在《柏林日报》发表致德国总理默茨公开信，直言德国正推动战争言论的“常态化”，使德国陷入危险的战略误判。萨克斯系统回顾了自1990年以来西方在北约东扩、科索沃战争及乌克兰问题上对俄罗斯的背信行为，批评德国陷入“历史修正主义”。他警告，柏林将战略思考“外包”给北约和美国，背离了欧洲应有的战略自主。他呼吁德国重拾勃兰特“新东方政策”的历史智慧，坚持欧洲安全不可分割原则，推动乌克兰走向中立与去军事化，通过外交而非对抗化解危机，避免欧洲重蹈灾难覆辙。

12月17日，《柏林日报》发表杰弗里·萨克斯公开信截图。

（翻译/北京对话 王凡非）

默茨总理：

你曾反复谈及德国对欧洲安全的责任。这一责任无法通过口号、选择性记忆或将战争言论常态化来履行。安全保障不是单向工具，它是双向的。这既不是俄罗斯的观点，也不是美国的观点；这是欧洲安全的一项基石原则，明确载入《赫尔辛基最后文件》、欧安组织框架以及战后数十年的外交实践中。

德国有责任以历史的严肃性和诚实态度对待这一时刻。就这一点而言，（德国）最近的言辞和政策选择都是不及格且危险的。

自1990年以来，俄罗斯的核心安全关切一再被无视、淡化或直接侵犯——这往往伴随着德国的积极参与或默许。如果要结束乌克兰战争，这段记录就不能被抹去；如果欧洲要避免陷入永久的对抗状态，这段记录就不能被忽视。

冷战结束时，德国向苏联及随后的俄罗斯领导人做出了反复且明确的保证，即北约不会向东扩张。这些保证是在德国统一的背景下做出的。德国从中受益匪浅。如果没有苏联基于这些承诺的同意，你们国家在北约框架内的快速统一是不可能发生的。后来假装这些保证不值一提，或者仅仅是随口一说，这不是现实主义，这是历史修正主义。

1999年，德国参与了北约对塞尔维亚的轰炸，这是北约首次在未经联合国安理会授权的情况下发动的大规模战争。这不是一次防御行动。这是一次开创先例的干预，从根本上改变了冷战后的安全秩序。对于俄罗斯而言，塞尔维亚不仅仅是一个抽象概念。其传递的信息明确无误：北约将在其领土之外使用武力，无需联合国批准，也无视俄罗斯的反对。

2002年，美国单方面退出了《反弹道导弹条约》，这是三十年来战略稳定的基石。德国没有提出严重异议。然而，军控架构的侵蚀并非发生在真空中。部署在更靠近俄罗斯边境的导弹防御系统被俄罗斯视为破坏稳定，这是合理的看法。将这些看法斥为偏执狂是政治宣传，而非稳健的外交。

2008年，德国承认科索沃独立，尽管有明确警告称这将破坏领土完整原则并树立一个将在别处引起反响的先例。俄罗斯的反对再次被斥为恶意，而不是被当作严肃的战略关切来对待。

2025年8月28日，德国总理默茨视察海军（图源：观察者网）

持续推动北约向乌克兰和格鲁吉亚扩张——正如2008年布加勒斯特峰会所正式宣布的那样——跨越了最鲜明的红线，尽管莫斯科多年来提出了激烈、明确、一致且反复的反对。当一个大国确定了一项核心安全利益并重申了数十年时，无视它不是外交，而是蓄意升级。

自2014年以来，德国在乌克兰扮演的角色尤为令人不安。柏林、巴黎和华沙一道，撮合了亚努科维奇总统与反对派之间于2014年2月21日达成的协议——一项旨在停止暴力并维护宪法秩序的协议。几小时内，该协议破裂，随之而来的是暴力推翻，一个新政府通过违宪手段产生了。德国立即承认并支持了新政权，德国担保的协议被抛弃而无需承担后果。

2015年的《明斯克协议II》本应是纠正措施——一个旨在结束乌克兰东部战争的谈判框架，德国再次担任担保方。然而，七年来乌克兰并未执行《明斯克协议II》。基辅公开拒绝了其中的政治条款。德国没有强制执行它们。德国前领导人和其他欧洲领导人后来承认，明斯克协议与其说是一个和平计划，不如说是一种缓兵之计。仅这一承认就应迫使人们进行反思。

在此背景下，对更多武器、更严厉言辞和更大“决心”的呼吁听起来很是空洞。它们要求欧洲忘记不久前的过去，以证明未来永久对抗的正当性。

是时候停止政治宣传和对公众进行道德上的低幼化处理了。欧洲人完全有能力理解安全困境是真实存在的，北约的行动是有后果的，假装俄罗斯的安全关切并不存在是无法实现和平的。

欧洲安全是不可分割的。这一原则意味着，任何国家都不能以牺牲别国安全为代价来加强自身安全，否则就会引发动荡。这也意味着外交不是绥靖，直面历史也不是背叛。

当地时间2025年10月16日，德国总理默茨在联邦议院发表讲话（图源：观察者网）

德国曾经明白这一点。“新东方政策”（Ostpolitik）不是软弱，而是战略成熟。它认识到欧洲的稳定取决于接触、军控、经济联系以及对俄罗斯合法安全利益的尊重。

今天，德国再次需要这种成熟。停止那种仿佛战争不可避免或战争是美德的论调。停止用盟友的言论来代替自己的战略思考。该开始认真地进行外交接触——不是作为一场公关活动，而是作为重建一个包含而非排斥俄罗斯的欧洲安全架构的真诚努力。

一个重焕生机的欧洲安全架构必须从清晰和克制开始。首先，它要求明确终止北约的东扩——无论是向乌克兰、格鲁吉亚，还是俄罗斯边境沿线的任何其他国家。

北约扩张并非冷战后秩序的必然特征；它是一种政治选择，是在违反1990年庄严承诺的情况下做出的，并且是在不顾其将破坏欧洲稳定的反复警告下推进的。

乌克兰的安全不会来自德国、法国或其他欧洲军队的前沿部署，这只会加剧分裂并延长战争。它将通过中立来实现，并辅以可信的国际保障。历史记录是明确的：在战后秩序中，无论是苏联还是俄罗斯联邦都没有侵犯中立国家的主权——没有侵犯芬兰、奥地利、瑞典、瑞士或其他国家。中立之所以有效，是因为它解决了各方的合法安全关切。没有正当理由假装它不能再次奏效。

其次，稳定需要非军事化和对等原则。俄罗斯军队应远离北约边境，而北约军队——包括导弹系统——必须远离俄罗斯边境。安全是不可分割的，不是单方面的。边境地区应通过可核查的协议实现非军事化，而不是充斥着越来越多的武器。

12月16日，美国知名经济学家杰弗里·萨克斯（中）出席塞尔维亚首都贝尔格莱德举行的一场对话会（图源：新华社）

制裁应作为谈判解决方案的一部分予以解除；制裁未能带来和平，却对欧洲自身的经济造成了严重损害。

特别是德国，应拒绝鲁莽地没收俄罗斯国家资产——这是对国际法的悍然违反，破坏了对全球金融体系的信任。通过合法的、经谈判达成的对俄贸易来复兴德国工业不是投降。这是经济现实主义。欧洲不应为了道德姿态而摧毁自己的生产基础。

最后，欧洲必须回归其自身安全的制度基础。欧安组织（OSCE）——而非北约——应再次成为欧洲安全、建立信任和军控的核心论坛。欧洲的战略自主正是意味着这一点：一个由欧洲利益塑造的欧洲安全秩序，而不是永远屈从于北约的扩张主义。

法国完全可以将其核威慑力量扩展为欧洲的安全保护伞，但只能以严格的防御姿态，且不得进行威胁俄罗斯的前沿部署。

欧洲应紧急推动回归《中导条约》（INF）框架，并推动涉及美国和俄罗斯——以及未来的中国——的全面战略核军控谈判。

最重要的是，默茨总理，请学习历史——并诚实地对待它。没有诚实，就不可能有信任。没有信任，就不可能有安全，而没有外交，欧洲就有可能重蹈其声称已吸取教训的灾难覆辙。

历史将评判德国选择记住什么——以及选择忘记什么。这一次，让德国选择外交与和平，并信守诺言。

以下为英文版：

Chancellor Merz,

You have spoken repeatedly of Germany’s responsibility for European security. That responsibility cannot be discharged through slogans, selective memory, or the steady normalization of war talk. Security guarantees are not one-way instruments. They go in both directions. This is not a Russian argument, nor an American one; it is a foundational principle of European security, explicitly embedded in the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE framework, and decades of postwar diplomacy.

Germany has a duty to approach this moment with historical seriousness and honesty. On that score, recent rhetoric and policy choices fall dangerously short.

Since 1990, Russia’s core security concerns have been repeatedly dismissed, diluted, or directly violated — often with Germany’s active participation or acquiescence. This record cannot be erased if the war in Ukraine is to end, and it cannot be ignored if Europe is to avoid a permanent state of confrontation.

At the end of the Cold War, Germany gave Soviet and then Russian leaders repeated and explicit assurances that NATO would not expand eastward. These assurances were given in the context of German reunification. Germany benefited enormously from them. The rapid unification of your country — within NATO — would not have occurred without Soviet consent grounded in those commitments. To later pretend that these assurances never mattered, or that they were merely casual remarks, is not realism. It is historical revisionism.

In 1999, Germany participated in NATO’s bombing of Serbia, the first major war conducted by NATO without authorization from the UN Security Council. This was not a defensive action. It was a precedent-setting intervention that fundamentally altered the post–Cold War security order. For Russia, Serbia was not an abstraction. The message was unmistakable: NATO would use force beyond its territory, without UN approval, and without regard for Russian objections.

In 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability for three decades. Germany raised no serious objection. Yet the erosion of the arms-control architecture did not occur in a vacuum. Missile-defense systems deployed closer to Russia’s borders were rightly perceived by Russia as destabilizing. Dismissing those perceptions as paranoia was political propaganda, not sound diplomacy.

In 2008, Germany recognized Kosovo’s independence, despite explicit warnings that this would undermine the principle of territorial integrity and set a precedent that would reverberate elsewhere. Once again, Russia’s objections were brushed aside as bad faith rather than engaged as serious strategic concerns.

The steady push to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia — formally declared at the 2008 Bucharest Summit — crossed the brightest of red lines, despite vociferous, clear, consistent, and repeated objections raised by Moscow for years. When a major power identifies a core security interest and reiterates it for decades, ignoring it is not diplomacy. It is willful escalation.

Germany’s role in Ukraine since 2014 is especially troubling. Berlin, alongside Paris and Warsaw, brokered the February 21, 2014 agreement between President Yanukovych and the opposition — an agreement intended to halt violence and preserve constitutional order. Within hours, that agreement collapsed. A violent overthrow followed. A new government emerged through extra-constitutional means. Germany recognized and supported the new regime immediately. The agreement Germany had guaranteed was abandoned without consequence.

The Minsk II agreement of 2015 was supposed to be the corrective — a negotiated framework to end the war in eastern Ukraine. Germany again served as a guarantor. Yet for seven years Minsk II was not implemented by Ukraine. Kyiv openly rejected its political provisions. Germany did not enforce them. Former German and other European leaders have since acknowledged that Minsk was treated less as a peace plan than as a holding action. That admission alone should force a reckoning.

Against this background, calls for ever more weapons, ever harsher rhetoric, and ever greater “resolve” ring hollow. They ask Europe to forget the recent past in order to justify a future of permanent confrontation.

Enough with propaganda. Enough with the moral infantilization of the public. Europeans are fully capable of understanding that security dilemmas are real, that NATO actions have consequences, and that peace is not achieved by pretending that Russia’s security concerns do not exist.

European security is indivisible. That principle means that no country can strengthen its security at the expense of another’s without provoking instability. It also means that diplomacy is not appeasement, and that historical honesty is not betrayal.

Germany once understood this. Ostpolitik was not weakness; it was strategic maturity. It recognized that Europe’s stability depends on engagement, arms control, economic ties, and respect for the legitimate security interests of Russia.

Today, Germany needs that maturity again. Stop speaking as if war is inevitable or virtuous. Stop outsourcing strategic thinking to alliance talking points. Start engaging seriously in diplomacy — not as a public-relations exercise, but as a genuine effort to rebuild a European security architecture that includes, rather than excludes, Russia.

A renewed European security architecture must begin with clarity and restraint. First, it requires an unequivocal end to NATO’s eastward enlargement — to Ukraine, to Georgia, and to any other state along Russia’s borders.

NATO expansion was not an inevitable feature of the post–Cold War order; it was a political choice, taken in violation of solemn assurances given in 1990 and pursued despite repeated warnings that it would destabilize Europe.

Security in Ukraine will not come from the forward deployment of German, French, or other European troops, which would only entrench division and prolong war. It will come through neutrality, backed by credible international guarantees. The historical record is unambiguous: neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation violated the sovereignty of neutral states in the postwar order — not Finland, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, or others. Neutrality worked because it addressed legitimate security concerns on all sides. There is no serious reason to pretend it cannot work again.

Second, stability requires demilitarization and reciprocity. Russian forces should be kept well back from NATO borders, and NATO forces — including missile systems — must be kept well back from Russia’s borders. Security is indivisible, not one-sided. Border regions should be demilitarized through verifiable agreements, not saturated with ever more weapons.

Sanctions should be lifted as part of a negotiated settlement; they have failed to bring peace and have inflicted severe damage on Europe’s own economy.

Germany, in particular, should reject the reckless confiscation of Russian state assets — a brazen violation of international law that undermines trust in the global financial system. Reviving German industry through lawful, negotiated trade with Russia is not capitulation. It is economic realism. Europe should not destroy its own productive base in the name of moral posturing.

Finally, Europe must return to the institutional foundations of its own security. The OSCE — not NATO — should once again serve as the central forum for European security, confidence-building, and arms control. Strategic autonomy for Europe means precisely this: a European security order shaped by European interests, not permanent subordination to NATO expansionism.

France could rightly extend its nuclear deterrent as a European security umbrella, but only in a strictly defensive posture, without forward-deployed systems that threaten Russia.

Europe should press urgently for a return to the INF framework and for comprehensive strategic nuclear arms-control negotiations involving the United States and Russia — and, in time, China. 

Most importantly, Chancellor Merz, learn history — and be honest about it. Without honesty, there can be no trust. Without trust, there can be no security. And without diplomacy, Europe risks repeating the catastrophes it claims to have learned from.

History will judge what Germany chooses to remember — and what it chooses to forget. This time, let Germany choose diplomacy and peace, and abide by its word.

本文转载自《柏林日报》网页版，原文链接:https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/politik-gesellschaft/offener-brief-von-jeffrey-sachs-lernen-sie-geschichte-herr-bundeskanzler-li.10010628